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PUTTING THE "NOTICE" BACK INTO PLEADING
Robin J. Effront
In the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, courts and commentators have
questioned whether notice pleading died with those cases. But what exactly
was notice pleading? In this Essay, I argue that the question of whether the
Court had "really" abandoned notice pleading in Twombly and Iqbal was
a distraction from the fact that afull-bodied doctrine of noticepleading had
never really existed in the first place. It had little separate existence from
general theories of openness and liberalism, yet the name provided some
rhetorical cover by insinuating that the standard was doing some sort of
work aside from screening out all but the most outrageous cases. At the
margins, notice pleading helped explain why some plaintiffs had
adequately stated a cause of action even if the complaint omitted the formal
niceties of reciting with precision the law under which those plaintiffs
sought relief or the exact elements of the cause of action. But beyond that,
courts only engaged in superficial examinations of why notice is important
to pleading and what actual notice might look like. The steady association
of notice with minimalism in this era had profound consequences for
pleading doctrine, but also for notice doctrines wholly unconnected with
pleading regimes.
This Essay explores the real origins of notice pleading and documents
the failure of courts to fully realize that doctrine in the Conley era. At the
heart of thisfailure is a mistaken belief that the minimization of the concept
of notice is necessary to bolster the court-access interests of vulnerable
plaintiffs. I suggest that a true notice pleading regime might have staved off
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the advent of plausibility pleading in Twombly and Iqbal and conclude
with suggestions for how to reincorporate the lost virtues of notice pleading
into our modern pleading regime.
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INTRODUCTION
Bell Atlantic v. Twomblyl and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 ushered in some of
the most momentous changes in civil procedure of the twenty-first
century. The Supreme Court supplanted the "notice pleading" regime of
Conley v. Gibson3 with the "plausibility pleading" under Twombly and
Iqbal.4 These decisions were lauded by some as a long-overdue remedy
i Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
2 Ashcroft v. Jqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
3 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
4 A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008) ("Notice
pleading is dead. Say hello to plausibility pleading." (footnote omitted)).
982
2020] PUTTING THE "NOTICE" BACK INTO PLEADING 983
for an "explosion" of expensive litigation,5 and panned by others as an
unnecessarily harsh restriction on court access for plaintiffs, particularly
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases, civil rights cases, and
antitrust actions.6
In this short Essay, I want to explore a somewhat different and
(perhaps) counterintuitive side of the "Twiqbal" story. Although the
journey from Conley to Iqbal is typically told as a story of court access
gained and then lost, this period also contained a parallel and more
complicated access-to-justice story. During this period, the Court
routinely reinforced a liberal and open pleading standard, but it did little
to define or elaborate on the "notice" part of notice pleading. In fact, the
rhetoric that courts and scholars used to maintain a liberal pleading
regime contributed to a larger assault on the concept notice itself-that it
was "mere" or "only" or "simple." In other words, fifty years of notice
pleading rhetoric communicated the subliminal yet powerful message
that "notice" could be synonymous with "minimal." Efforts to integrate
5 See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern
World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits ofTwombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1107, 1110 (2010) ("[B] road, bare-bones notice pleading has rightfully 'earned
its retirement,' and that lower courts could benefit from a framework for determining the
plausibility of a complaint." (footnote omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563)); Jayne S.
Ressler, Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 627, 631 (2009) (praising
Twombly's emphasis on "a desire for more efficient, cost-effective pleading"); Mark Moller,
Procedure's Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645 (2011) (defending Twombly and Iqbal as decisions
properly enabling legal pluralism); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV.
1063, 1064 (2009) (arguing that "the angst" over Twombly "is largely unwarranted").
6 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 331-47 (2013)
(criticizing Twombly and Iqbal); Spencer, supra note 4, at 433 (discussing the "plausibility
pleading standard and conclud[ing] that it is an unwarranted interpretation of Rule 8 that will
frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims to get into court"); Scott Dodson, New Pleading
New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 64-68 (2010) (describing problems with Twombly, Iqbal,
and the screening of so-called meritless claims); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment
Motion: The Motion to Dismiss under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010)
(criticizing the decisions as an inappropriate conversion of the motion to dismiss into an effect
motion for summary judgment); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil
Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND.
L.J. 119 (2011). But see Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1314
(2010) (criticizing aspects of Twombly and Iqbal but suggesting a closer reading in which "Iqbal's
framework is not in fundamental conflict with notice pleading").
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the substantive concepts of notice into pleading doctrine were spare and
mostly superficial.
The minimization of notice is problematic because, just like
pleading, notice is also about court access. Constitutionally,7 notice is
important because of its logical connection to a party's "opportunity to
be heard." While it is tempting to think of court access as primarily a
plaintiff-side problem, defendants too have court access issues. Consider,
for example, the debtor who has signed a cognovit clause, or the victims
of so-called "sewer service," a phenomenon in which constructive notice
has overtaken a meaningful examination of whether some vulnerable
defendants have actually received a summons and complaint. Notice
presents a court-access conundrum because the procedural protections
that typically bolster notice to defendants often are themselves procedural
and financial court-access barriers for plaintiffs. The rhetorical and
doctrinal minimization of notice as a due process right distracts from the
extent to which robust notice doctrines and practices buoy defendants'
access to justice.
The use of the label "notice pleading," alongside the half-century
characterization of that term as "mere" and "minimal," had important
consequences for the broader concept of notice and for pleading doctrine
itself. Part I introduces the broader concept of notice as a due process
right that raises thorny court-access issues. Part II traces the more specific
history of notice pleading from its introduction in the early twentieth
century through its adoption as a part of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8 and the Conley decision. Following Conley, notice pleading was never
fully realized as its own independent concept of pleading with a strong tie
to a deep meaning of notice. I then track its decline after Twombly and
Iqbal. In Part III, I consider what a more fully-realized notice pleading
doctrine might have been, and how returning to the concept of notice
might inform or change the plausibility pleading standard going forward.
7 While the "notice" in notice pleading does not refer to the due process right of notice, the
larger connections between the many uses of "notice" in procedural law are inescapable. Thus, a
genealogy and exploration of the term is in order.
[Vol. 41:981984
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I. SITUATING NOTICE IN THE NARRATIVES OF COURT ACCESS
The story of pleading in the twentieth century is traditionally cast as
a court-access drama. The question of specificity in pleading "involves
balancing two conflicting goals: screening frivolous suits (which favors
stricter pleading) versus facilitating meritorious suits (which favors more
liberal notice pleading)."8 According to the standard court-access
narrative, prior to Twombly and Iqbal, the prevailing pleading regime was
"notice pleading" as defined by the standard in Conley v. Gibson.9 The
complaint did not need to be especially elaborate, detailed, or conform to
arcane formalities that served as traps for the unwary. It simply needed to
state enough information such that the defendant had adequate notice of
the plaintiffs claims such that the defendant could appear and begin to
mount a defense. Twombly and Iqbal "moved the system from a notice
pleading structure... to a fact pleading structure, which is exactly what
the Federal Rules were drafted to reject."0
If notice pleading was open and liberal, then plausibility pleading is
narrow and exclusive. "Notice" was pro-plaintiff; a court-access
buzzword synonymous with the lower bar that a plaintiff had to clear in
the pre-Twombly and Iqbal world. To further this narrative, minimalist
notice acted in service of the underdog plaintiff who lacked sufficient
access to information to make the specific factual allegations that might
be required under a heightened pleading standard. But taken seriously,
the rights surrounding notice (and its mechanical manifestation, service
of process) are not necessarily "bare" or "minimal."
8 Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961, 2005 (2007).
9 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[A] complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.").
io Miller, supra note 6, at 346.
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A. The Constitutional Context and History of Notice
The right of notice and opportunity to be heard predates the
founding and the Constitution.II The "principle of natural justice which
requires a person to have notice of a suit before he can be conclusively
bound by its result,"12 was seen as a "natural right" and part of the general
law which also once grounded other important procedural protections
such as personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court cemented notice and
opportunity to be heard as a constitutional procedural due process right
in Pennoyer v. Neff.13 Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the Supreme Court and lower courts would nod approvingly,
often with lofty rhetoric, at the concept of notice. Until the mid-twentieth
century, however, very few cases pushed the boundaries of
constitutionally acceptable service of process practices because of
Pennoyer's personal in-hand service requirement.14 In situations where
substituted service was permissible,15 the Court had the opportunity to
reinforce the importance of notice as a "principle of natural justice,"16 and
as a necessary means to the opportunity to be heard which is a
"fundamental requisite of due process of law."17
The modern due process standard for notice is flexible and relatively
low. As the Supreme Court announced in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank, notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action."18 Such a
standard was meant to ensure that courts would stay attentive to the core
it See Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 23, 30-32 (2018) (summarizing the early American history of notice and
opportunity to be heard).
12 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 406 (1855).
13 Effron, supra note 11, at 33-35.
14 See RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 130 (2004) ("During the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the Supreme Court rarely had occasion to discuss the form that notice had to take in
in personam actions.., because its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.., ensured, as a practical
matter, that defendants in such actions received notice through personal service of process.").
is Prior to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), substituted service was
constitutionally permissible for a smattering of cases including proceedings in rem, or lawsuits
that utilized nonresident motor vehicle statutes. See Effron, supra note 11, at 36-39.
16 Lafayette Ins. Co., 59 U.S. at 406.
17 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
8t Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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values of notice and opportunity to be heard while avoiding the problem
of placing "impossible or impractical obstacles"19 in the way.of plaintiffs
who want to move forward with a lawsuit.
In the decades since Mullane, the Supreme Court has added little to
constitutional notice,20 particularly the constitutional dimension of
notice that is required in ordinary adversarial litigation.21 Notice is largely
governed by the state, federal, and international law rules that dictate the
procedures for service of process. Compared to other procedural issues,
notice has garnered relatively little scholarly and judicial attention. One
should not conclude, however, that modern notice and service practices
are satisfactory or unproblematic. Rather, one might wonder why the
injustices-potential and actual-of poor notice receive so little attention
in comparison to other access to justice problems such as the growth of
arbitration clauses, the restriction of class actions, and the diminishing
scope of personal jurisdiction.
B. Notice and the Court Access Conundrum
From the beginning, the problem of court access has lurked in the
background of notice doctrine. Notice pits the court-access rights and
privileges of plaintiffs against those of defendants. For plaintiffs, notice is
a barrier to court access. It adds time and expense to a lawsuit before the
plaintiff can proceed on the merits. This is why many jurisdictions
(including the federal courts) have procedures for procuring and
encouraging waiver of formal service of process.22 But even the process of
obtaining waiver is another stumbling block on the wait to the plaintiff's
19 Id. at 313-14.
2o There has, however, been more development of the "opportunity to be heard" prong of
notice. In these cases, the Court has narrowed and refined the situations in which a party must
be given an "opportunity to be heard" before the deprivation of a constitutionally protected due
process right, and defined the sort of hearing or proceeding that suffices as an "opportunity to be
heard."
21 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006); Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S.
478 (1988); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v.
Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Briseno v.
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017).
22 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (procedure for waiver of service of process in federal court);
FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.070(i) (Florida state procedure for waiving formal service of process); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-4(d) (2010) (Georgia state procedure for waiving formal service of process).
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"day in court." For defendants, on the other hand, it is a lack of notice
that creates the court-access barrier. To state the obvious, there is no
meaningful court access for a defendant if he does not know of a lawsuit
or other pending action that might result in a binding judgment that
permanently alters his rights and obligations.
The barriers go beyond mere receipt of service of process. A
defendant might be personally served, but if the notice is vague, or dense,
or filled with technical jargon, it is questionable whether that party has
been meaningfully notified. In the same way that a pro se plaintiff does
not have the same meaningful court access as a represented plaintiff,23 an
unrepresented defendant might need counsel to help make sense of a
summons and complaint. And sometimes, a defendant -might have
consented to a waiver of notice altogether before a cause of action even
accrues; thus the only notice she ever receives is notice that she won't get
notice at all.24
A legal system that would demand the highest degree of notice-
notice that actually (rather than constructively) reaches the defendant
and communicates the relevant information to the defendant in a clear,
complete, and easily comprehensible manner, would be expensive and
burdensome for plaintiffs, thus worsening court access. But in a legal
system that has a relatively low threshold for notice requirements, the
court-access burdens are borne by defendants who might be ill-notified
of their legal predicament or fail to learn about it at all until after the entry
of a default judgment. This is the court-access conundrum of notice in a
nutshell. Removing barriers for plaintiffs creates stumbling blocks for
defendants, while easing the notice barriers for defendants ramps up
court-access costs for plaintiffs.
The fact that the Supreme Court has structured the due process
standard for notice as a balancing test does not suggest in any direct way
that the plaintiffs court access should be favored over the defendant's.
23 See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1227 (2014) (documenting the access to justice difficulties for pro se litigants).
24 This is accomplished via a cognovit or "confession of judgment" clause, used primarily in
lending contracts, in which the debtor agrees in writing that upon a certain event of non-
payment, the creditor may obtain a judgment for the unpaid debt without serving the debtor with
process or any other sort of notice. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the use of such clauses
in a contract between two sophisticated commercial parties. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405
U.S. 174, 176, 187-88 (1972).
[Vol. 41:981988
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But prior to International Shoe25 and Mullane, notice had, for the most
part, been a defendant (or recipient) centered inquiry. By shifting the
inquiry to encompass the plaintiff s court-access interest, the Court began
to shift the discourse around notice to one in which "too much" notice
could be problematic.
To be clear, none of this is to suggest that there is something wrong
or nefarious about centering plaintiffs court access interests when
considering notice. Notice could easily have followed a similar path as
personal jurisdiction post-International Shoe: a doctrine that once
promised generous court access to plaintiffs, but that was warped and
winnowed by decades of Supreme Court pruning. Plaintiffs should not
have to face arcane and expensive procedures just to get a foot in the
courthouse door. That being said, the tacit assumption seems to have
become that notice is a court-access problem for plaintiffs and not for
defendants. As we shall see, this mid-century shift collided with the 1940s
revolution in federal pleading. And the chosen nomenclature-"notice
pleading"-would have effects on both notice and pleading for the
decades to come.
Notice did not follow a stereotypical trajectory of a due process right
that grows stronger, or at least accrues a dense doctrinal discourse, over
time. For several decades, notice was bolstered by Pennoyer's strict
jurisdictional requireinents, and thus never developed the real doctrinal
muscle to back the lofty rhetoric upon which the right was once based.
And once the Court introduced the court-access interests of plaintiffs,
meaningful development of notice doctrine stagnated.
II. THE MINIMIZATION OF NOTICE IN THE NAME OF LIBERAL PLEADING
Notice pleading figures prominently in the pre-Twombly and Iqbal
court-access story. By the time that those cases called it into question, the
term "notice pleading" seemed like a natural and inevitable part of the
procedural landscape. But the relationship between notice and pleading
should not be taken for granted. The repeated use of the label had
consequences for pleading doctrine and notice doctrine alike. This Part
provides a brief history of how "notice pleading," used first by scholars
25 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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and then by judges, exerted subtle yet powerful effects on the trajectory
of both doctrines.
A. The Early History of Notice Pleading
A major innovation of the 1938 revolution in civil procedure was to
simplify and liberalize the pleading rules in federal court.26 The
requirement in Rule 8(a)(2) that the plaintiff need only give "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'
was drafted by jurists who "were deeply steeped in the history of the
debilitating technicalities and rigidity that characterized the prior English
and American procedural systems."27 The post-Conley practice of
contrasting notice pleading with fact pleading does not map onto the
early debate or formulation of the term. In the pre-Conley era,
[c]ommentators on both sides of the continuing debate drew a
distinction between "notice" pleading and pleading
issues.... [T]he underlying disagreement concerned the degree
to which adjudication should conform to positive law. Today,
notice pleading is more often contrasted with "fact"
pleading. . which entails a more specific statement of facts.28
But courts and commentators in the first part of the twentieth century
were slow to adopt "notice pleading" as a ubiquitous moniker with a
settled meaning.
The term "notice pleading" first appears in the early twentieth
century. Roscoe Pound first introduced the idea in his 1910 article, Some
Principles of Procedural Reform. Although he did not use the phrase
"notice pleading" itself, he wrote that the purpose of procedural rules
such as those governing pleadings should be to provide "a fair
opportunity of meeting the case against him and of making his own case"
and ensuring that "no other advantage could be had than securing a fair
26 For a complete and concise history of the introduction and rise of notice pleading, see Paul
Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 109-14 (2009).
27 Miller, supra note 6, at 288-89.
28 Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52
How. L.J. 73, 85-86 (2008).
990 [Vol. 41:981
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opportunity to meet proof adduced without fair notice."29 The idea of
notice pleading slowly permeated the scholarly and judicial discourse
prior to the drafting and passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in the mid-1930s. Professor Clarke Whittier conducted the first sustained
academic inquiry into "notice pleading"30 in 1918. His writing sheds some
light on how scholars were thinking about the "notice" part of notice
pleading at its inception. He traced the idea of notice pleading to the
procedure in English courts as governed by the Judicature Act of 1873,31
and early twentieth century innovations in the Chicago municipal courts
and in Michigan courts.3 2 According to Whittier, pleadings should be
drafted so that the opponent is not taken by surprise later in litigation
because "[t]he cardinal principle of notice pleading is that enough shall
be stated adequately to apprise the opponent of the cause of action or
defense."33 The purpose of such minimalism was to slash the number of
cases that were decided on the pleadings, rather than proceeding to trial,
and he even engaged in some rudimentary empirical analysis to show that
the few jurisdictions that had adopted notice pleading had far fewer
dismissals at the pleadings stage. 34 That same year, Professor Austin
Wakeman Scott portrayed notice pleading as "the other extreme" of
specific fact pleading regimes; one that required "only such a description
of the cause of action as will give to the opposite party notice of the nature
of the claim against him."35
Scholars did not uniformly assume that the adoption of notice
pleading would unquestionably lead courts away from fact pleading and
its attendant problems. Writing in 1927, Professor Thomas Atkinson
wrote that "there is often a failure to comprehend that pleading to a
29 Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REv. 388, 401 (1910); see
also Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 527 (2006).
3o Clarke B. Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1918).
31 Id. at 506-07.
32 Id. at 509-10. The author of a 1931 Comment in the Texas Law Review noted in passing
that "[n] otice pleading is present in some inferior courts, and there is a substantial agitation for
the adoption of this procedure for all courts in order to prevent delay." Lee Jackson Freeman,
Pleading and Practice-Relation of the Petition to the Jurisdiction of the Court, 9 TEX. L. REV. 254,
261-62 (1931).
33 Whittier, supra note 30, at 516-17.
34 Id. at 506-10.
35 Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV.
669, 679-80 (1918).
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specific issue will give notice .... But it is not necessary or desirable to go
to the extreme of stating what the testimony is expected to be."36 In other
words, he was concerned that, if taken seriously, the concept of notice
might lead courts right back to the days of demanding factual specificity
in complaints. He then cautioned that "[olften the disclosure of the legal
theory upon which the pleader proceeds is sufficient to avoid surprise."37
On this reading, the concept of notice pleading had not yet calcified into
the rote incantations of "bare," "mere," or "minimal" that would solidify
in the decades to come. For Atkinson, "notice pleading" meant that
judges sometimes might have to do some work to figure out what
combination of legal theory and factual specificity really did put the
defendant in the position of avoiding surprise. Professor Sidney Post
Simpson echoed this sentiment in 1939, opining that "notice
pleading.., would be substantially as useful.., in effectuating the
purpose of notice to the parties. But, to insure the development of the real
issues before trial, it would have to be supplemented."38
In 1935, Charles Clark and James William Moore published their
monumental article in the Yale Law Journal, A New Federal Civil
Procedure,39 in which they voiced many of the ideas that would find a
home in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a single, comprehensive
work.40 This included an ethos of a liberal pleading standard with the
"short and simple statement" formula that would eventually become Rule
8(a)(2).41 Clark and Moore did not use the term "notice pleading" at any
point in the article, and as we shall see, it is unclear if Clark ever endorsed
notice pleading at all. Their defense of the proposed pleading standard
3 Thomas E. Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of Limitations, 36 YALE L.J. 914, 918 n. 12 (1927).
37 Id. (emphasis added).
38 Sidney Post Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem, 53 HARV. L. REV. 169,
197 (1939).
39 Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 1291
(1935).
40 Clark is a drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
41 Clark & Moore, supra note 39, at 1302-03. During this time, the rules' drafters also
carefully considered the new rules for notice and service of process. For a detailed account of this
history, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1165-
67 (1982).
[Vol. 41:981
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focused on simplicity and uniformity, and the explicit idea of "notice" did
not figure prominently in this discussion.42
In general, the term "notice pleading" was slow to catch fire as a
category or idea unto itself. Many of the mentions of "notice pleading"
prior to the drafting of the Federal Rules and its later formal introduction
as standard in Conley v. Gibson were simply citations to the Whittier piece
Notice Pleading.43 Recall that Professor Simpson, writing shortly after the
adoption of the new Federal Rules, still wrote about notice pleading in the
conditional tense, contemplating what a notice pleading system would do
rather than what current pleading standards did d0.44 Indeed, "[i]n the
decades that immediately followed adoption of the Federal Rules, there
was not universal acceptance of Rule 8's simplicity and brevity."45
B. From the Introduction of the Federal Rules to Conley
Soon after the introduction of Rule 8(a)(2), federal courts began to
evaluate pleadings with reference to the idea of notice.46 But the term
"notice pleading" did not enter the routine judicial lexicon until around
1946,47 even though some scholars had been using the term intermittently
for the past three decades. In the mid-1940s, courts began the now-
familiar practice of labeling the new standard "notice pleading" and then
connecting it to the idea of notice as well as the idea of minimalism.4S The
42 Clark & Moore, supra note 39, at 1306 (for a brief mention of notice, only in connection
with technical aspects of defendants' pleadings).
43 See, e.g., Comment, The Effect of Pleading on Jurisdiction, 36 YALE L.J. 549, 556 (1927)
(noting "the development of notice pleading, since adopted in some of our states").
44 Simpson, supra note 38, at 197.
45 Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 558 (2002).
46 See Cont'l Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1942) ("Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure the function of the complaint is to afford fair notice to the adversary of
the nature and basis of the claim...."); Sierocinski v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 103 F.2d
843, 843-44 (3d Cir. 1939) (rejecting defendant's argument that the plaintiffs complaint did not
give sufficient notice of the nature of his claim).
47 Bowles v. Pure Oil Co., 5 F.R.D. 300, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Wagner Mfg. Co. v. Underwood,
No. 6235, 1946 WL 3278, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 1946); United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,
7 F.R.D. 338, 340 (S.D. Cal. 1947); Metropolis Bending Co. v. Brandwen, 8 F.R.D. 296, 297 (M.D.
Pa. 1948) ("To the pleadings is assigned the task of general notice giving .... ).
48 Porter v. Shoemaker, 6 F.R.D. 438, 439-40 (M.D. Pa. 1947) (identifying the new pleading
standard as "notice pleading" and stating that "[u]nder the new rules, the purpose of the
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new nomenclature made its way into state courts around this time as well,
although usually as a means of distinguishing the continued fact-pleading
state regimes from the new federal standard.49 The term was by no means
ubiquitous or even common, appearing in only a smattering of cases
between the mid-1940s and the 1957 Conley decision, almost all
emanating from courts in the Third Circuit. Interestingly, these few
decisions refer breezily to "a system"50 or "our system"51 or "the theory"52
of notice pleading, as if that nomenclature had already been widely
adopted. In fact, only one court outside of the Third Circuit used the
term, and did so by way of responding to a party's use of that term in its
brief.53
Doctrinally, Dioguardi v. Durning4 is thought to have kicked off the
notice pleading era. Judge Charles Clark, the lead drafter of the Federal
Rules, penned the Second Circuit opinion. The plaintiff, a pro se litigant,
filed an "obviously home drawn" complaint regarding the disposition of
two cases of medical tonics by a customs collector. The plaintiff did not
formally identify a cause of action in his complaint, but Judge Clark held
that Dioguardi had, "however inartistically.., stated," asserted a claim
for relief, because under the new Rule 8(a)(2), "there is no pleading
requirement of stating 'facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action."155
pleadings is to give notice of what an adverse party may expect to meet" and that "[t]he modern
philosophy concerning pleadings is that they do little more than indicate generally the type of
litigation that is involved." (emphasis added)).
49 See, e.g., Langenberg v. City of St. Louis, 197 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Mo. 1946) ("The legislature
in enacting the new Code has not sanctioned 'notice pleading' which, it has been asserted by
some, is contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... ); Livingston v. Stewart &
Co., 69 A.2d 900, 903 (Md. 1949).
so Stevenson v. Isaacs, 126 F. Supp. 411,413 (D. Del. 1954) ("The present rules adopt a system
of notice pleading .... ").
51 Auto. Serv. of Reading, Inc. v. Reading Tr. Co., 93 F. Supp. 907, 909 (E.D. Pa. 1950)
("[U] nder our system of notice pleading the complaint need only put the defendant on notice of
what it will be called upon to meet."); Ryan v. Jones, 92 F. Supp. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1950) ("[N]o
more is required under our system of notice pleading.").
52 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 134 F. Supp. 829, 832 (W.D. Pa. 1955) ("[T]he
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rejected the theory of fact pleading and adopted the theory
of notice pleading."); MacDonald v. Winfield Corp., 82 F. Supp. 929, 930 (E.D. Pa. 1948)
(referring to "the theory of notice pleading, introduced by the Federal Rules").
53 Putnam v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 112 F. Supp. 885, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (citing
defendant's use of the term "notice pleading" in its argument).
54 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
55 Id. at 775.
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Although it is frequently cited as solidifying notice pleading as the
standard for Rule 8(a)(2),56 Judge Clark does not actually use the term
"notice pleading" in the opinion, and in fact, Judge Clark himself
remarked a decade later in both academic writings and judicial opinions
that "'notice' is not a concept of the Rules."57
Despite Judge Clark's uneasiness with notice pleading, Dioguardi is
still seen as the seed from which full-fledged notice pleading would sprout
a decade later in Conley. As Professor Emily Sherwin has observed, "[t]he
difference between notice pleading and issue-oriented pleading is easy to
see in Dioguardi v. Durning" because "the complaint was adequate for
purposes of notice, although it did not come close to pleading a
framework of legal issues for trial."58
The Supreme Court's first explicit recognition of notice pleading
came not in a pleadings case, but in Hickman v. Taylor,59 a case about
attorney work product. Justice Murphy explained that
[u]nder the prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of
notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation were
performed primarily and inadequately by the pleadings.... The
new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general
notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with
a vital role in the preparation for trial.60
56 See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1815 n.224 (2015);
William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865,
1879 (2002) (Dioguardi's "confused complaint was deemed sufficient to satisfy the low threshold
of notice pleading."); Fairman, supra note 45, at 558 n.63 (recounting Supreme Court oral
argument in which the "Court directed the petitioner to begin discussion of notice pleading, not
with Conley v. Gibson, but with the 'classic' Dioguardi decision"); Sherwin, supra note 28, at 86
n.66 (citing Dioguardi as "discussing the distinction between notice pleading and the substance
of the pleading").
57 Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 49 (1957); United States
v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1956) (Clark, C.J.); see also Edward A. Hartnett, The
Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 473, 476 n.19 (2010).
58 See Sherwin, supra note 28, at 86.
59 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 451 (1986) ("Conley
v. Gibson itself appeared to endorse the notice pleading idea, which the Supreme Court had
previously suggested was the sole purpose of pleadings.").
6o Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500-01.
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It is thus in Hickman that we observe the genesis of associating the
"notice-giving" function with an ethos that is not just liberal but is
minimalist. Notice is a non-specific "general" task; something to which
pleadings are "restricted" and for which not much is needed. By
deemphasizing pleadings, the Court could accentuate the importance of
information to be obtained and disclosed later in the process.
C. From Conley to Twombly and Iqbal
It was another decade before the Supreme Court announced notice
pleading as a standard in an actual pleadings case. Conley v. Gibson6l
"permanently introduced the term 'notice pleading' into the judicial
lexicon"62 a good seven years after Mullane ushered in the era of
constitutional notice minimalism. Professor Stancil has commented on
this choice of words as a deliberate choice to contrast the new, liberalized
pleading rules with "their arcane, demanding, and complex
predecessors,"63 but as Professor Reinert has observed, "Conley was a
strange poster child for notice pleading" because "the plaintiffs had
provided extensive factual detail [and] had specified their legal claims."64
Notice was chosen for its minimalism,65 having been associated with a
"fundamental philosophical change.., that cast away formal and fact-
intensive pleadings in favor of merely providing a party 'notice."'66
Following Conley, courts began a five-decade project of modifying
the term "notice pleading" with diminutive adjectives and adverbs. At
first, many judges defaulted to Conley's phrase "simplified 'notice
pleading,"'67 conveying the action of the rules drafters who chose to
61 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
62 Stancil, supra note 26, at 111.
63 Id.
64 Reinert, supra note 6, at 128.
65 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 4, at 434 (" [T]he complaint simply would initiate the action
and notify the parties and the court of its nature while subsequent stages of the litigation process
would enable the litigants to narrow the issues and test the validity and strength of the asserted
claims.").
66 Schwartz & Appel, supra note 5, at 1117-18.
67 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); see also Porter v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.,
354 F.2d 840, 843 (5th Cir. 1966); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen of N. Am., Local Union No. 88, 410 F.2d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1969); A.T. Brod
& Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 1967).
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simplify the entire pleading system from its complex fact-pleading
structure to the streamlined standard under Rule 8. But slowly, courts
shifted from using language that emphasized the act of simplification to
language that characterized notice itself as simple. The term "notice
pleading" rarely appeared in isolation. Rather, it was almost always
accompanied by a word such as "mere,"68 "bare,"69 "simple,"70
"minimal,"71 or "low."72 State courts used such language as well, either to
.o See, e.g., United States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1216 n.3 (10th Cir.
1986) ("[M]ere notice pleading."); Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunbelt Beer Distribs., Inc.,
839 F. Supp. 376, 379 n.4 (D.S.C. 1993) (same); Bos. & Me. Corp. v. Town of Hampton, 987 F.2d
855, 862 (1st Cir. 1993) (same).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Tex- Educ. Agency (Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist.), 138 F.R.D. 503,
511 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (associating "notice pleading" with the "bare bones of the notice"); Tamura,
Inc. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (describing a standard of "the
barest notice pleading"); Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 1986) (comparing
what is needed to survive summary judgment with "the bare allegations of notice pleading");
Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. State ofWyo., 514 F. Supp. 595, 596 (D. Wyo. 1981) (" [T]he
barest notice pleading."); Evers v. Evers Marine Serv., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1283, 1287 (D.N.J. 1980)
("[T]he complaint is a bare skeleton of 'notice' pleading...."); S. Side Drive-In Co. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 30 F.R.D. 32,34 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ("[T]he bare requirements of notice
pleading....").
70 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bums, 316 F. Supp. 803, 804-05 (D. Haw. 1970) ("[S]imple
'notice pleading."'); Simpson v. Gallant, 231 F. Supp. 2d 341, 349 (D. Me. 2002) (same); In re
Szymanski, 344 B.R. 891, 896 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006) (same); Sheldon v. Vermonty, 53 F. Supp.
2d 1157, 1161 (D. Kan. 1999) ("Rule 8(a)'s simple 'notice' pleading directive."); In re Sturdevant,
415 F.2d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[T]he simple standard of notice pleading."); Zimmermann v.
Zimmermann, 395 F. Supp. 719, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("[T]he simple notice pleading requirements
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)."); Breeland v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 179 F. Supp. 464, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
("[T]he simple notice pleading contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); Manicini
Enters., Inc. v. Am. Express Co., 236 F.R.D. 695, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2006) ("Rule 8(a)'s simple notice
pleading requirements.").
71 See, e.g., Hollins v. U.S. Postal Serv., 645 F. Supp. 735, 739 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("[T]he
minimal requirements of notice pleading."); In re Bessette, 226 B.R. 103, 106 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1998) ("[M]inimal 'notice pleading."'); Moll v. Carter, 179 F.R.D. 609, 610 (D. Kan. 1998)
("[Mjinimal standards of notice pleading."); Mason v. Cty. of Del. Sheriffs Dep't, 150 F.R.D. 27,
28 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[Elven the minimal notice pleading requirements...."); Pomeroy v.
Ashburnham Westminster Reg'l Sch. Dist., 410 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D. Mass. 2006) ("[E]ven the
minimal requirements of notice pleading.").
72 Response Oncology, Inc. v. MetraHealth Ins. Co., 978 F. Supp. 1052, 1064 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
("[T]he admittedly low requirements of notice pleading."). Some courts refer to a "low
threshold." See Pete Thoesen Tractor & Equip. Repair Co. v. City of Chicago, 101 F.R.D. 734, 735
(N.D. Ill. 1984); Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 2000). Or even
an "exceedingly low threshold." Hutton v. Priddy's Auction Galleries, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 428,
434 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Other refer to a "low bar." See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Posey, 415 F.3d
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describe their own notice pleading regimes or to contrast notice pleading
with a different state standard.73 These terms were sometimes used to
contrast the low threshold of 8(a)(2) with the heightened standard under
Rule 9 or other statutory schemes with special pleading requirements.74
These modifiers appeared steadily in the 1960s and 1970s, were used with
increasing frequency in the 1980s, and became nearly ubiquitous by the
1990s through the Twombly decision. It was neither obvious nor
inevitable that courts would use minimizing language rather than
language that suggested openness in connection with notice pleading. In
fact, a less popular yet still visible modifier for notice pleading was to
characterize the regime as "liberal."75
391, 396 (5th Cir. 2005). Or a "low hurdle." Bleau v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation
Ass'n, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litig.,
356 F. Supp. 2d 484,493 (M.D. Penn. 2005).
73 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Dearborn Cty., 422 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981) ("[Clonsidering the 'bare bones' approach of notice pleading."); Herman v. State, 330
Mont. 267, 278 (2006) (noting the "mere notice pleading requirements for an ordinary
complaint"); Ross v. City of Gatlinburg, 327 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (E.D. Tenn. 2003); La Salle Nat'l
Tr. v. Vill. of Mettawa, 249 Ill. App. 3d 550, 558 (1993) ("[M]ore than mere notice pleading is
required in Illinois."); Daniels v. Daniels, 885 A.2d 524, 531 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
("[Tlhe very low standard of notice pleading...."); Pac. Nw. Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of
Sequim, 158 Wash.2d 342, 352 (2006) ("Washington is a notice pleading state and merely
requires a simple, concise statement of the claim and the relief sought."); Peeples v. State of Utah,
100 P.3d 254, 259 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) ("[O]ur notice-pleading requirements are already
minimal."); Peacock Constr. Co. v. Erickson's, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 544, 544 (1970) ("[T]he very
minimal requirements of notice pleadings.").
74 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bagley v. La Vallee, 209 F. Supp. 529, 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1962)
("No matter how liberal the modern approach may be to federal habeas corpus proceedings," the
standard is not "in the form of a bare notice pleading."); Hunt v. Am. Bank & Tr. Co., 606 F.
Supp. 1348, 1363 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (Rule 9(b) is an exception to "mere notice pleading."); United
States v. 1625 S. Delaware Ave., 661 F. Supp. 161, 162 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("[C]ivil forfeiture
proceedings [must] be pleaded with greater specificity than the mere notice pleading .. ");
Lloyd v. Vannatta, 296 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[Miere notice pleading is not sufficient in
the habeas corpus context."); In re Stone, 588 F.2d 1316, 1319 (10th Cir. 1978) (contrasting
"simple notice pleading" with "the rule relating to relief from default judgments .... ); Lerma v.
Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1026 (E.D. Wis. 1999) ("Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 requires simple notice pleading.").
75 Sometimes, however, the characterization of notice pleading as "liberal" was still
accompanied by one of the other terms such as "simple" or "low." See, e.g., PKG Grp., LLC v.
Gamma Croma, S.p.A., 446 F. Supp. 2d 249, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he liberal pleading
standards of Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., require nothing more than simple notice pleading."); Milk
Drivers, Dairy & Ice Cream Emps., Laundry & Dry Cleaning Drivers, Clerical & Allied Workers
Local Union No. 387 v. Roberts Dairy, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1061 (S.D. Iowa 2003) ("[T]he liberal
and simple standard required by the Rule 8(a) notice pleading standard.").
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At the same time that courts made a habit of associating pleading
with minimizing language, very little was done to flesh out the "notice"
side of notice pleading. When courts bothered to invoke the concept of
notice at all (rather than just use the label "notice pleading"), it was most
likely a rote invocation of the purpose of notice pleading,76 or a
conclusory observation that the complaint had adequately given notice to
the defendant.77 Occasionally, a court might invoke the simplicity of
notice pleading to chastise a litigant for "produc[ing] a complaint so
complicated and unwieldy that defendants will have great difficulty in
framing a pleading that will be responsive."78
Although this was a time of linguistic minimization of notice, it was
not an era of minimizing the centrality of pleadings. Throughout the
Conley era, courts did not unquestioningly endorse any and all pleadings.
On the contrary, they did grant motions to dismiss for complaints
deemed insufficient under Rule 8(a)(2),79 and sometimes the word "bare"
was paired with "legal conclusions" instead of "notice pleading" to
illustrate what was not acceptable.80 This pattern of lower court demands
for "heightened pleading" in the years between Conley and Twombly has
76 See, e.g., Bautista v. Los Angeles Cty., 216 F.3d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]hat is the point
of notice pleading: a plaintiff need only provide the bare outlines of his claim."); Alexander v.
City of S. Bend, 256 F. Supp. 2d 865, 881 (N.D. Ind. 2003) ("Simple notice pleading is adequate
to bring a § 1983 action against governmental entities so long as a plaintiffs complaint provides
the defendant entities 'fair notice' of the claim and 'the grounds upon which it rests."'); FTC v.
Consol. Foods Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1344, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("These minimal requirements
have been characterized as 'notice' pleading. Under notice pleading, courts have consistently held
that it is no longer necessary to state 'facts' as long as fair notice of the claim is given." (internal
citation omitted)).
77 Frieri v. City of Chicago, 127 F. Supp. 2d 992, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("[F]ederal pleading is
'notice' pleading, so the question on a motion to dismiss is whether [plaintiffs] allegations, even
if bare and boilerplate, give notice of her claims against the City.").
78 Cooper v. N. Jersey Tr. Co., 250 F. Supp. 237, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
79 See sources cited in Fairman, supra note 45; see also Luthy v. Proux, 464 F. Supp. 2d 69,
79 (D. Mass. 2006) ("It can be difficult to discern a bald assertion from proper notice pleading.
Some precedent indicates that simple notice of a custom or policy is not enough .... ").
8o This emerged from an oft-cited quote from the Wright, Miller, & Cooper treatise at the
time. See, e.g., Barrett v. Wallace, 107 F. Supp. 2d 949, 952 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (the standard "does
not relieve a plaintiff of his obligation to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements and allege
more than bare assertions of legal conclusions"); In re SCB Computer Tech., Inc. 149 F. Supp. 2d
334, 343 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) ("[Mlore than bare assertions of legal conclusions is ordinarily
required to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements." (quoting Schneid v. Fanny Farmer
Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988))).
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been well-documented.81 The problem for notice pleading is that very
few, if any, of these cases appear to have involved a serious engagement
with the actual concept of notice writ large or notice pleading in
particular.82 Instead, these cases centered around a concern about the
deficiencies in what a plaintiff could say or prove, rather than a concern
about what plaintiff had communicated to the defendant and whether this
communication furthered the cause of notice.
In responseto the lower court drift toward "heightened pleading,"
the Supreme Court twice rebuked the lower courts for straying from a
liberal pleading standard. In both Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit3 and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A.,84 the Court reiterated the centrality of notice pleading to Rule
8(a)(2) which it described as "liberal," and thus "impossible to square
with the 'heightened pleading standard' applied" by the lower court in
Leatherman,85 and "simple," "simplified," and "liberal" in Swierkiewicz.86
The Swierkiewicz opinion mirrored the lower court opinions of that era
that endorsed notice pleading-it contained the rote incantation that a
pleading "must simply 'give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,"'87 but did nothing
to flesh out what notice might be.
Thus, as the Conley period drew to a close, "notice pleading" was
firmly associated with minimalism. Any apparent diversions from
"liberal" pleading standards did not do so in the name of notice, but
instead in the name of skeptical intuitions about the merits of the lawsuit
81 See Fairman, supra note 45, at 574-90; Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal:
A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 12 (2010) ("[A] number of
lower court federal judges... frequently applied more demanding pleading standards in many
types of cases .... ").
82 But see, e.g., Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 909, 921-22 (N.D. Iowa 2003)
("The only function left to be performed by the pleadings alone is that of notice. For these
reasons, pleadings under the rules may properly be a generalized summary of the party's position,
sufficient to advise the party for which incident he is being sued, sufficient to show what was
decided for purposes of res judicata, and sufficient to indicate whether the case should be tried
to the court or to a jury.").
83 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
84 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
8s Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
86 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512-14.
87 Id. at 512 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
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in question and concerns about litigation costs and the promotion of so-
called "fishing expeditions."88
D. Notice Pleading in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal
By the time the Supreme Court issued its landmark Twombly
decision, two patterns in pleading jurisprudence had become evident.
First, a non-trivial number of lawyers, commentators, and lower court
judges exhibited varying levels of discomfort with the Conley standard as
it was generally interpreted. Although the criticisms were not completely
uniform, there was some consensus among the Conley critics that the
current pleading standard was too open and liberal, and that judges were
not deploying motions to dismiss aggressively enough to screen out
particularly speculative or meritless cases. On the other side, proponents
of liberal pleading tightened their grip around the most open and liberal
formulation of the pleading standard, pointing repeatedly to the
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz rebuke of lower court rebellions against
liberal pleading.
For Conley's supporters, any engagement with limiting language in
a pleading standard ran the risk of opening the door to a standard that
would shut the courthouse door to worthy plaintiffs. Thus, the "notice"
in notice pleading had ossified into a verbal placeholder. Conley critics
dutifully recited the "notice pleading" standard, perhaps out of habit, and
perhaps because the term "notice" did not appear to be the true barrier to
a heightened pleading standard. Conley defenders clung to "notice
pleading" because it had simply become a synonym for a "low" or
"liberal" standard. Since very few courts had truly engaged with the
"notice" aspect of notice pleading, supporters could continue to invoke
the phrase without worrying that a meaningful examination of the phrase
might result in anything but the most generous of pleading standards.
The benign neglect of the "notice" in notice pleading left a void. An
opportunistic Supreme Court was in a position to fill it by using the
phrase to redefine the standard in a heightened manner. Or it could
quietly dispose of the term altogether. As this Part shows, Twombly did
the former whereas Iqbal did the latter, although it is not clear that the




lower courts have similarly abandoned the "notice" in notice pleading.
What follows is an account of what happened to notice pleading in
Twombly and Iqbal and a reflection of how the whole notice pleading
story itself has affected both notice and pleading.
E. The Impact of Twombly and Iqbal
What happened to notice pleading in Twombly? After the Supreme
Court handed down its opinion, Professor Spencer declared that "[n] otice
pleading is dead."89 As Part II of this Essay has shown, however, the
problem is not that the court abandoned notice pleading in Twombly.
Rather, the problem is that "notice pleading" never really existed as a
meaningful idea outside of the concepts of pleading as "minimal," "bare,"
or "simplistic." Given the vague status of "notice" in notice pleading,
however, it is not entirely clear exactly what (if anything) about notice
pleading died with Twombly.
In his opinion, Justice Souter severed the "notice pleading" language
of Conley from the "no set of facts" language, writing that
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Conley v. Gibson spoke
not only of the need for fair notice of the grounds for entitlement
to relief but of "the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief."90
Justice Souter then proceeded to the now-famous retirement of the "no
set of facts" language. But it is plausible91 to read this passage as an
attempt to preserve notice pleading, or at least present the illusion that
the Court intended for some semblance of liberal and open pleading to
survive Twombly. Justice Souter could assure the reader that the Court
had not abandoned notice pleading. Rather, the Court could simply
retain the moniker "notice pleading" and pry it away from the decades of
association between notice and minimalism.
89 Spencer, supra note 4, at 431.
o Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Conley,
355 U.S. at 45-46).
91 Pun intended.
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Notice pleading, then, was an empty vessel that allowed for
continuity with the past. The Court could abandon the specific offending
Conley language without "really" overturning Conley itself because, after
all, notice pleading still remained. The question of whether the Court had
"really" abandoned notice pleading in Twombly was a distraction from
the fact that a full-bodied doctrine of notice pleading had never really
existed in the first place. It had little separate existence from general
theories of openness and liberalism, yet the name provided some
rhetorical cover by insinuating that the standard was doing some sort of
work aside from screening out all but the most outrageous cases. At the
margins, notice pleading helped explain why some plaintiffs had
adequately stated a cause of action even if the complaint omitted the
formal niceties of reciting with precision the law under which those
plaintiffs sought relief or the exact elements of the cause of action. 92 But
beyond that, courts only engaged in superficial examinations of why
notice is important to pleading and what actual notice might look like.
Iqbal then confirmed the emptiness, if not the irrelevance, of notice
pleading. Justice Kennedy did not explicitly reject notice pleading or
retire the term with any fanfare. It was simply absent from the entirety of
the majority opinion. The Court's new project was to refine and elaborate
on the plausibility standard. Notice pleading added little to this endeavor.
Justice Souter, in his Iqbal dissent, clung to the idea that notice pleading
was a meaningfully distinct doctrine that could exist apart from and
alongside the plausibility standard that he announced in Twombly. He
tried to reconcile his own opinion in Twombly with the earlier Conley
regime and the expanded plausibility standard in Iqbal. On his reading,
the Iqbal complaint gave the defendants "'fair notice of what the.., claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests."'93
92 Sherwin, supra note 28, at 75 ("Today, the notion of issue pleading has been relegated to
history: no one maintains that plaintiffs must specify the elements of a legal cause of action in
their complaints."); see also Acosta v. Byrum, 180 N.C. App. 562,568 (2006) ("To require plaintiff
to describe particular provisions of the rules and regulations would defeat the purpose of simple
notice pleadings, i.e., to place the opposing party on notice of all claims and defenses."); Lekas v.
Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 614 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[N]oting that even though a complaint may comply
with the simple notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), it may nonetheless be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff does not present legal arguments supporting the 'substantive
adequacy' or 'legal merit' of that complaint").
93 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 698-99 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545 (quoting
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)).
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There is some disagreement among the lower courts about whether
notice pleading survived the Twiqbal revolution. Many judges did not
immediately abandon notice pleading after Iqbal. For the most part the
decisions that continue to use the term notice pleading do so in a manner
consistent with pre-Twiqbal opinions. That is, a court will use the label
"notice pleading" without much elaboration.94 Some deployments of the
label suggest that "notice pleading" is practically interchangeable with
"plausibility pleading;" for example, the Fifth Circuit's casual observation
that "notice pleading.., requires 'enough facts [taken as true] to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face." '95 Most of the disagreement,
then, mirrors the older battles between tighter and looser pleading
standards with "notice pleading" deployed as a synonym for open or
liberal pleading.
Some courts maintain that notice pleading is still a viable concept.
The Fourth Circuit, for example, opined that "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure remain committed to a notice-pleading standard that was
adopted when the Rules were first promulgated in 1938."96 In a decision
issued shortly after Iqbal, the Seventh Circuit declared that
Twombly and Erickson together.., mean that "at some point the
factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy that the
complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to
which the defendant is entitled under Rule 8." This continues to
be the case after Iqbal.97
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, describes plausibility pleading
as a distinct standard that "represents a balance between Rule 8's roots in
relatively liberal notice pleading and the need to prevent... 'largely
groundless claim [s] "' from proceeding past a motion to dismiss.98 In light
94 See, e.g., FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282,1296 (11th Cir. 2011); ABB
Turbo Sys. AG v. TurboUSA, Inc., 774 F.3d 979, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Rogers v. Capital One Bank
(USA), 190 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1146-47 (N.D. Ga. 2016); Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network,
748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
95 United States ex rel. Rigsby v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 794 F.3d 457, 466 n.5 (5th Cir.
2015).
96 Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 548 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)).
97 Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc.
v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007)).
9s Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2014).
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of the uncertainty about the current status of notice pleading, both as a
label and as a substantive concept, the next Part examines the possible
future of notice pleading in the post Twiqbal era. While this might look
like a circuit split, the reality is that the disagreement concerns whether
and how the term can be repurposed. As we shall see in the following Part,
even the Seventh Circuit's formulation calls into question whether a true
notice pleading regime really survives into the Twiqbal era.99
III. THE FUTURE OF NOTICE AND THE FUTURE OF PLEADING
A. The Future of Notice
This Essay primarily concerns pleading, and thus is not the forum
for an extended discussion of the due process dimensions of notice in its
own right. However, it is worth reiterating the rhetorical battering that
the term "notice" took during the notice pleading era. The minimization
of notice in the name of jealously guarding court access occurred
alongside a general practice of subordinating notice to other procedural
rights and interests. Concerns about the scope of personal jurisdiction,
the enforcement of arbitration clauses, and a host of other procedural
issues have dominated the discourse. Meanwhile, questions about how
suboptimal notice practices might prejudice the rights and interests of
defendants-many of whom might actually belong to vulnerable
populations-have been subordinated to other procedural concerns,
either out of passive disregard, or out of an active fear that paying too
much attention to notice will jeopardize the ability of most litigants to
vindicate their rights in public tribunals. I have written elsewhere that we
need not accept this court-access conundrum as a settled state of affairs.
For purposes of this Essay, it is enough to hold pleading up as an unlikely
but very real example of how a procedural doctrine-somewhat distant
from the mechanics of service of process-can impact the Fourteenth
Amendment discourse about notice.
99 See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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B. The Future of Pleading
What would happen if we were to put the "notice" back into notice
pleading? As this Essay has shown, the concept of notice pleading was a
relatively late-breaking phenomenon in the long history of pleading
doctrines and practice, and it did not even garner the full-throated
support of rules-drafter Charles Clark himself. Even in its heyday, notice
pleading was more of a moniker or label than a fully realized legal
concept. So, to suggest a "restoration" or "return to" notice pleading
might be a bit much, as it is not entirely clear to what sort of concept or
standard jurists would be returning.
We can begin by imagining what might have become of Conley had
courts paid as much attention to notice as they did to the "no set of facts"
language. The "no set of facts" standard drove courts, litigants, and
commentators into two opposing camps. The staunch defenders of "no
set of facts" saw it as a key ingredient of maximal courthouse access for
plaintiffs, worrying that any movement away from the low bar would
slam the courthouse doors shut to deserving plaintiffs in the name of
screening frivolous lawsuits. Critics of that standard saw it as such a low
bar that it effectively permitted all but the most outrageously implausible
complaints to make it past a motion to dismiss. 100 And once it became the
case that total implausibility was the only way out of the Conley standard,
then it is no surprise that the Supreme Court turned to plausibility as the
way in to pleading. As we saw, it only took two years after the
introduction of plausibility pleading for the Supreme Court to quietly
drop notice pleading from its pleading discourse.101
Given that plausibility pleading has now been with us for over a
decade, it is unlikely that the Court would turn back the clock to try notice
pleading, but this time, take it seriously as a pleading standard. It would
be doctrinally awkward (although not impossible) to retract the test
announced in Twombly and clarified in Iqbal. Still, one might wonder
what might have happened if courts had invested more in developing the
scope and definition of notice pleading. One possibility is that a meatier
ioo This does not account for successful motions based on legal rather than factual
insufficiency, but that never seemed to be the chief complaint of Conley critics.
ioi The Court mentioned the notice pleading standard in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007), in the context of a quote from Twombly. The Supreme Court has not used the phrase
since.
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(although still presumably liberal and open) standard might have staved
off the strawman construction of Conley as an intolerably low standard.
Another is that the Twiqbal revolution was inevitable, but it might have
consisted of an insistence on refining or tightening the scope of notice
pleading, rather than turning to the entirely new paradigm of plausibility
pleading. We will never know what might have resulted from this
counterfactual world. But, imagining what a more robust "notice
pleading" regime might have looked like enables us to envision how
courts could slip notice back into pleading just as quietly as it
disappeared.
Recall that notice pleading emerged as a response to two distinct
pleading problems from the pre-1938 era of civil procedure. The first was
difficulty that resulted from the hypertechnicalities of earlier pleading
regimes which had the effect of barring a number of otherwise completely
meritorious actions simply because the parties had failed to conform -to
any number of the byzantine niceties required by a complex set of rules.
The second problem was the difficulty of sorting so-called "meritorious"
actions from the unworthy "bogus" lawsuits that ought not clog the
courts' dockets.
Notice pleading was meant to cure the first problem by introducing
a simple and (mostly) transsubstantive standard to replace the arcane
rules of pleading regimes past. And it was meant to solve the second
problem by assuming that pleading need only take care of the most basic
sorting. The "real" work of disaggregating worthy from unworthy
lawsuits was to come later in litigation, especially through careful judicial
supervision of discovery. What, then, does notice have to do with either
of these problems? Notice does little work with regard to the first
problem. It simplified pleading regimes in virtue of its potential for
universal application and relatively uniform nature, but this could be true
of any number of other standards besides notice. "Plausibility," for
example, serves precisely the same function of superficial
transsubstantivity.
But notice might actually really matter to the sorting problem. By
shifting the meritoriousness problem away from pleading and into
discovery and later stages of litigation, notice pleading transformed
pleadings from a mostly technical and bureaucratic affair to an
adversarial affair. Notice pleading did not assume that courts would no
longer sort meritorious from nonmeritorious claims (to the extent that
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this had even been a reality in the prior regimes). The pleading (and
concomitant motion to dismiss) itself was not intended to be the primary
site of sorting. Instead, pleading should be designed to facilitate sorting.
And notice, if taken seriously, might facilitate the sorting of meritorious
actions.
What follows is a brief sketch of what might have been the tenets of
a fortified notice pleading regime; that is, a regime in which notice
pleading would be a liberal standard that enables court access, but is also
tied to the belief that sorting would occur at some early post-complaint
stage of a lawsuit. The three central tenets of a notice pleading regime are:
(1) specification of the pleading audience, (2) recognizing the centrality
of legal sufficiency, and (3) the subjectivity of factual sufficiency and
accounting for informational asymmetries.
Specification of the Pleading Audience. The idea of notice is
inherently dialogic; that is, it contemplates that the pleading is a
document that communicates something to an intended audience. Prior
to notice pleading, the court (or judge or chancellor) had been the
assumed audience for a pleading, standing in for the public or world at
large. It was not that the defendant was unimportant, it was simply the
case that a pleading was meant to communicate certain information
regardless of the particular identity of the recipient. The emphasis was on
conformity with a given set of procedures rather than communication of
information. Notice pleading seemed poised to replace the generality of
conformity with formal requirements with the specificity of
communication to a designated audience.
As Part II demonstrates, the early rhetoric around notice pleading
stressed that the defendant was the intended audience of a pleading.02
This does not mean that defendants were the only audience for a pleading.
The notice feature of pleading was presumably additive to the earlier
assumptions about the centrality of courts and judges. Thus, pleadings
are meant to communicate relevant information both to the defendant in
particular and to the public in general, as embodied by the court. The
question of audience is important because, as we shall see, a notice regime
that has a specific audience is one that allows for variation in what might
be "sufficient" based on the identity of the defendant-audience. This
102 See infra Section II.A.
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variation, in turn, would be smoothed out later on in litigation via factual
development and merits determinations.
The Centrality of Legal Sufficiency. A notice pleading regime would
center legal sufficiency.103 From a civil procedure perspective, legal
sufficiency is sometimes overlooked because most of the disputes over
legal sufficiency concern the areas of substantive law for which the
plaintiff may or may not have stated a claim. But the question of whether
a given set of facts amount to a cognizable claim is key. It is hardly novel
to recognize the procedural benefits of an early determination of whether
there is law under which a plaintiff may be entitled to relief. Perhaps it is
because this feature of pleading is so obvious and undisputed that it is
simply taken for granted. Legal sufficiency is connected to both audiences
of notice pleading. Notice pleading recognizes that a pleading should
communicate to the court what sort of lawsuit to expect and
communicate to the defendant how it should prepare. This is why the
ability to add and refine causes of action later in the lawsuit is intimately
connected with the adverse party's expectations from the outset of the
pleadings.104 Notice pleading sets up the architecture for later legal as well
as factual developments in litigation.
Defining the legal parameters of a lawsuit is not identical to
screening cases with some sort of goal of prognostication as to its merits.
To downplay the centrality of legal sufficiency is to paint a picture of
pleading in which a permissive fact pleading threshold looks like it's not
"doing" enough work. But a reminder of the centrality of legal sufficiency
illustrates that notice pleading is always "doing" important work, and we
need not always expect more from a complaint or the motions that test
its sufficiency.
The Subjectivity of Factual Sufficiency and Accounting for
Informational Assymetries. Although notice pleading centers legal
sufficiency, it does not exclude the dimension of fact pleading. In addition
to communicating the plaintiff's anticipated legal arguments, the
complaint contains the plaintiffs account of the factual background of
the case. But because notice pleading centers adverse parties as a distinct
audience, rather than limiting the audience to a disconnected public,
notice pleading will not treat all facts equally. The plaintiff need not be
103 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
io4 See FED. R. CIv. P. 15.
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charged with notifying the defendant in detail about facts already within
its possession, or facts to which the defendant has cheaper or easier access
than the plaintiff.
This feature of notice pleading was that which best protected
plaintiffs' court-access interests in lawsuits alleging discriminatory or
conspiratorial conduct among defendants such as employment
discrimination and antitrust cases. If the plaintiff alleged facts within the
defendants' putative knowledge or control, it did not allow defendants to
hide behind the fact that plaintiffs did not have access to the information.
The key feature of notice pleading, then, is that it accounts for
information asymmetries, but does not reify them in a way that
disadvantages either plaintiffs or defendants. A stronger notice pleading
regime would have protected vulnerable plaintiffs who could not
reasonably be expected to notify a defendant of its own hidden conduct.
But it also would have engaged more with the question of whether the
inferences alleged from the stated facts really notified the defendants of
the factual and legal situations from which the plaintiffs had good reason
to expect to find. In other words, a strong notice pleading regime might
have allowed a fishing expedition in a well-identified lake but not an
ocean. To stretch the analogy further, notice pleading would have
demanded that the plaintiff identify what sort of fish she might catch, but
not verify the existence of any individual fish in advance of the trawling
expedition.
While this approach might not always immediately cull the
supposedly "nonmeritorious" lawsuits from the federal docket at the
motion to dismiss, a subjective approach to factual sufficiency under a
stronger notice pleading regime might have facilitated a more searching
look at the plaintiff's factual allegations at the outset. Even the optics of
investigating the knowledge gaps between plaintiff and defendant might
have kept at bay the nagging feeling harbored by Conley skeptics that the
"no set of facts" language unfairly favored plaintiffs. A stronger notice
pleading regime would have forced plaintiffs and courts to account for
the defendant and communicate the legal and factual parameters of the
lawsuit to come.
In one of the few extended discussions of notice pleading after
Twombly and Iqbal, the Seventh Circuit linked notice pleading with
plausibility. Judge Wood framed the pleading question presented as
"whether [the] factual allegations provide sufficient notice to defendants
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of [the plaintiffs] claims."105 She then explained that the main "take away
from Twombly, Erickson, and Iqbal" was that "[fWirst, a plaintiff must
provide notice to defendants of her claims. Second, courts must accept a
plaintiffs factual allegations as true, but some factual allegations will be
so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to
defendants of the plaintiffs claim."106 But in the end, the notice issue
collapsed back into plausibility. Judge Wood agreed with the district
court's assessment that a set of facts were just too implausible to
meaningfully inform the defendant of the case against him. This was a
curious formulation; it is unclear how the plausibility of facts fail to
inform a defendant. A set of facts might be perfectly clear (and thus
informative), yet still implausible. If implausibility is the standard under
Twiqbal, there might not be much that a judge can do beyond adjust her
own expectations of plausibility.107 But to say that to be implausible is to
be non-informative does not ring true. This odd equivalence between
notice and plausibility has gone unremarked upon, save for the Seventh
Circuit district and appellate judges who have included the Brooks
formulation in a standard citation. Perhaps no one paused to consider
whether this definition of "notice" pleading made much sense, because
we had all been conditioned to think of notice pleading as the empty
vessel into which judges would pour their expectations or understandings
of the Rule 8 pleading standard.
This hypothetical notice pleading regime is far from a perfect answer
to that perpetual "pleading problem."108 Its late-breaking appearance in
modern jurisprudence and the relative paucity of early academic
discourse surrounding the term might have doomed it to its life primarily
as a synonym for liberal pleading rather than a deeper concept that
enabled and justified a particular form of liberal pleading. Even if courts
had engaged more meaningfully with the concept, it is likely that it would
have been just as difficult to define with precision the meaning of "notice"
as it has been to articulate the meaning of "plausible."
1os Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009).
1o6 Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
107 And, as other scholars have shown, there is ample room for such discretion and
adjustment.
i08 Recall that in 1939, Professor Simpson optimistically titled his article, A Possible Solution
to the Pleading Problem. See Simpson, supra note 38. By 2010, Professor Steinman was among




There is an advantage, though, in notice pleading. However
indeterminate the words might be, it might have better accounted for the
relative needs of both plaintiffs and defendants, rather than Conley and
Twiqbal, in which the pendulum seems to have swung from
overemphasizing the relative position of plaintiffs to that of defendants.
Regardless of how true that might have been, the current doctrinal reality
is plausibility pleading. There might still be room for some of the old
promise of notice pleading to reenter pleading discourse. Putting the
"notice" back in pleading would allow courts to shift from the passive
voice ("the plaintiff's complaint is plausible") to the active voice ("the
plaintiffs complaint notifies the defendant of the legal basis for relief and
communicates the facts that support several possible inferences"). A court
might conclude that a plaintiff has not cast a wide net in a vast ocean
without any support or feedback in sight. Rather, she plans to cast several
discrete lines into a lake with the expectation that other recognizable
vessels that have trawled these waters can and will guide her toward
meaningful finds.
Notice pleading is the opening of a dialogue. Plausibility might be
measured against how this defendant could respond, rather than how a
neutral third-party observer might understand various legal and factual
allegations. While much of this is contrary to some of the language from
Twombly and Iqbal, it might, as a descriptive matter, explain the difficulty
that courts have had in determining whether a statement is "conclusory"
and thus must be disregarded for purposes of evaluating the pleading.109
CONCLUSION
The era of notice pleading is gone, and it is a shame that it slipped
away before courts and commentators had really given it its due. I have
suggested some small ways in which the concepts behind notice pleading
might still live on in the world of plausibility pleading, namely, by
centering the importance of legal sufficiency determinations and by
shifting the plausibility inquiry into a subjective, audience-centered
perspective. I do not expect these to result in any monumental shifts in
plausibility pleading.
109 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see also Howard M. Erichson, What Is the
Difference Between a Conclusion and a Fact?, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 899 (2020).
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Perhaps, then, the contribution of this Essay, beyond heaving a
historical sigh, is to provide a partial blueprint for pleading reformers.
Those who wish to reform the federal pleading standard through an
explicit change to Rule 8 or through congressional legislation would do
well to be deliberate in their choice of words for a pleading standard. A
"return" to notice pleading might be a far more successful enterprise if it
is resurrected as a fully realized concept and doctrine, and not just as the
superficial label it once was.
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